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In this paper we employ a tax-competition model to demonstrate that in the presence of 
migration the re-distributive advantage of a non-linear income tax system over a linear (flat) 
one is significantly mitigated relative to the autarky (no-migration) equilibrium. When 
migration threats are sufficiently strong, a coordinated shift from a non-linear (prima-facie 
superior) system to a flat (inferior) regime is not too welfare-costly, even when the extent of 
re-distribution is significant. Therefore, such a shift may be warranted on administrative 
grounds. We also show, as expected, that migration reduces the extent of redistribution. 
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1.  Introduction 
Linear (flat) tax systems are considered simpler, hence cheaper to administer than non-
linear ones [often raised arguments refer to enhanced compliance and lower extent of 
avoidance  associated  with  flat  tax  regimes;  see  Hall  and  Rabushka  (1985),  for  an 
elaborate discussion of the merits of flat tax]. Reluctance to ‘flattening’ the tax system 
(via  the  consolidation  of  tax  brackets  and/or  income  sources),  notwithstanding  the 
administrative  advantages  associated  with  a  flat  tax,  is  often  attributed  to  the  latter’s 
limited re-distributive capacity. Unlike a linear system, which in its most simple form, 
accords a universal demo-grant (basic income) across the board, a non-linear tax may 
employ means-testing to enhance the target-efficiency of the re-distributive system.   
Prior to the 1990’s hardly any countries enacted flat tax systems (a rare exception 
was Hong Kong). Since 1994, when the Baltic republics of Estonia and Lithuania first 
introduced a flat tax regime, many countries followed suit. In 2001 Russia introduced a 
flat personal income tax (PIT) of 13%.
1 By 2005, already nine countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe had a personal income flat tax in place, up and running (OECD, 2005).  
  In his seminal work Mirrlees (1971) raised the possibility that a flat tax may be the 
optimal  choice  of  the  government,  by  presenting  simulations  which  showed  that  the 
optimal tax schedule for the US is approximately linear (notably, this result is derived 
without taking into account the additional administrative advantages associated with a flat 
system). This result has received fairly limited attention by the subsequent literature, and 
has  been  disputed  on  the  grounds  of  the  parametric  assumptions  underlying  the 
simulations, that were allegedly driving the result [see Tuomala (1990)]. Mirrlees (1971) 
examined a closed economy, where workers were utterly immobile. Four decades later, in 
the backdrop of a globalized world economy in which workers have become ever-more 
mobile, addressing the effect of labor migration on the extent of re-distribution and the 
desirable properties of the tax-and-transfer system has never been more timely. 
  The  voluminous  literature  on  tax  competition  has  primarily  focused  on  capital 
taxation [see Wilson (1999) for a comprehensive survey]. The key message conveyed by 
the literature suggests that competition over mobile capital would lead to inefficiently low 
taxes and under-provision of public goods, in contrast with the Tiebout paradigm [see 
                                                            
1 Notably, a year after the reform has been implemented, tax revenues from PIT increased by 46%. Ivanova 
et al. (2005) found that the reform had a significant behavioral effect on tax compliance. Gorodnichenko et 
al. (2007) found a strong influence of the reform on tax evasion.   3
Wilson  (1986)  and  Zodrow  and  Mieszkowski  (1986)].  This  prediction  is  empirically 
supported by a documented shift from capital to labor taxation: over the years 1965-1995 
the share of wage taxes in total tax revenues increased from 45% to 65% in the OECD.
2 
  Another strand in the literature, more directly related to our paper, examines the 
optimal labor income tax system in the presence of mobile labor. A key feature of this 
literature is that competition over mobile labor limits the re-distributive power of the state 
[see  Wilson  (1980),  (1992),  Mirrlees  (1982),  Widasin  (1994),  Hindriks  (1999)  and 
Osmundsen (1999), amongst others)]. Most of the literature on tax competition and the 
effect  of  mobility  on  redistributive  policy  focused  on  linear  tax-transfer  schemes. 
Recently, several papers have revisited the issue in the context of non-linear taxation. 
Some papers cast the problem in a partial-equilibrium setting, examining the effect of 
migration on the properties of the optimal non-linear tax schedule of the state, taking the 
other  states’  tax  schedules  as  exogenous  outside  options  [see  Wilson  (2006),  Krause 
(2007) and Simula and Trannoy (2010)]. Hamilton and Pestieau (2005) consider a general 
equilibrium setting where some of the workers are (perfectly) mobile. They focus on the 
case of small-open economies, where each country ignores the effect of its re-distributive 
policy on international migration; hence, governments are not strategic competitors. Other 
papers [Piaser (2007), Brett and Weymark (2008) and Morelli et al. (2010)] consider a 
general  equilibrium  setting  and  explicitly  model  the  strategic  interaction  across  tax 
authorities. Piaser (2007) considers a setting with two identical countries and two skill 
levels, and demonstrates that when migration costs are sufficiently small, the income tax 
schedule entails no distortions. This result stands in contrast to the case of autarky (no 
migration), where a standard result in the literature suggests that low-skill individuals 
would be subject to a strictly positive marginal tax rate [Balcer and Sadka (1982) and 
Stiglitz (1982)]. Brett and Weymark (2008) consider a setting with two governments and 
a finite number of types. They illustrate a ‘race to the bottom’ argument in the case of tax 
competition and perfect mobility of the workforce, by showing that there do not exist 
equilibria in which either the most highly-skilled pay taxes or the lowest skilled receive 
transfers. Morelli et al. (2010) consider an extension of Piaser (2007) with three types of 
workers. They focus on the constitutional choice, within a federation comprised of two 
states, between a unified (centralized) tax system, where an identical tax system for both 
states is set by the central authority (hence there are no incentives to migrate between the 
                                                            
2 With the exception of Turkey and the UK.    4
two states); and  an independent (decentralized)  tax system,  where the tax schedule is 
independently determined by each state, taking into account that citizens can migrate from 
one state to the other. They show that as migration costs rise, it becomes increasingly 
likely that the decisive middle class (the plausible scenario in the constitutional choice 
phase) will prefer to have a unified system.      
In this paper, we re-visit Mirrlees (1971) by examining the case for a flat tax in the 
presence of migration threats. Employing the analytical framework used by Piaser (2007), 
we  consider  a  tax  competition  game  between  two  identical  countries  populated  with 
individuals with two skill-levels. We compare between a non-linear tax regime and a flat 
tax system and demonstrate that in the backdrop of a high-skill migration threat (due to a 
reduction  of  the  migration  costs  faced  by  high-skill  individuals),  the  re-distributive 
advantage of a non-linear system over a linear (flat) one is significantly mitigated. In the 
presence of migration, and in sharp contrast to the autarky case, a coordinated shift to a 
flat  system  (with  its  entailed  administrative  advantages),  still  allowing  for  fiscal 
competition between countries (by maintaining the countries' sovereignty over the welfare 
state generosity), is not too welfare-reducing; and when administrative costs are taken into 
account, such a shift may prove to be mutually beneficial for both countries. We also 
examine the stability of the linear-tax equilibrium. Starting from equilibrium in the tax 
competition game between the two countries where both countries are restricted to linear 
schedules, we show that the gain associated with a unilateral (uncoordinated) deviation to 
a non-linear tax system by one of the two countries is fairly small, even when the extent 
of  re-distribution  is  significant.  Thus,  taking  into  account  the  administrative  gains 
associated  with  a  flat  system  (relative  to  a  non-linear  tax  regime),  even  when  both 
countries may choose a general non-linear tax regime, an equilibrium where both do set a 
flat system in place is likely to form.  We also confirm the race-to the-bottom hypothesis 
that suggests that migration reduces the extent of redistribution. 
  The structure of the remainder of the paper will be as follows. In section 2 we 
present the model. In section 3 we introduce the government problem and solve the tax 
competition  game  under  the  non-linear  tax  regime.  In  section  4  we  present  the  tax 
competition  game  under  the  linear  tax  regime.  Section  5  compares  the  two  regimes. 
Section 6 examines the stability of the linear-tax equilibrium. Section 7 briefly concludes.  
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2.  The Model 
We consider a global economy which is comprised of two identical countries (i=1, 2). 
Each country produces a single consumption good employing labor inputs with different 
skill  levels.  We  follow  Mirrlees  (1971)  by  assuming  that  the  production  technology 
exhibits constant returns to scale and perfect substitutability across skill levels.  
Individuals differ in three attributes: (i) innate productive ability (skill-level), (ii) mobility 
costs (between the two countries) and (iii) mobility opportunity – only high-skill workers 
are able to migrate. For simplicity we assume that there are only two skill levels, where 
we denote by  1 w  and 1 2 w w > , the productive ability (and the competitive wage rate) of 
the low-skill individual and high-skill individual, respectively. We follow Mirrlees (1971) 
by assuming that skill levels are private information unobserved by the government. We 
normalize  the  world  population  to  2  and  assume  that  the  measures  of  the  low-skill 
population  and  the  high-skill  population  are  given,  respectively,  by  2 1 1 < <α  and 
1 0 2 < <α ,  where  1 2 2 α α + = .  This  assumption  plausibly  reflects  the  observed  (right) 
skewed wage distributions.  
Turning next to mobility costs, we assume that in the absence of any differences 
across  the  two  countries  (in  terms  of  the  fiscal  policy  implemented  by  the  local 
government) the world population of each skill-group is equally divided between the two 
countries.  Without  being  excessively  unrealistic  we  assume  that  only  high-skill 
individuals  can  migrate;  that  is,  migration  is  prohibitively  costly  for  all  low-skill 
individuals.
3 The mobility cost, in consumption terms, incurred by a high-skill resident of 
country i who migrates to the other country, is denoted by m and, in order to render our 
analysis tractable, is assumed to be distributed uniformly over the support  ] 2 / , 0 [ δ . When 
the parameter δ  assumes extreme values (zero or infinity), we obtain, respectively, the 
limiting cases of costless migration and no migration (autarky). 
                                                            
3  For supporting empirical evidence see Docquier and Marfouk (2005) who show that in 2000, high skilled 
individuals  were  six  times  more  likely  to  emigrate  than  low  skilled  ones.  The  departure  of  high-skill 
individuals to tax-havens has become a major concern amongst governments [OECD, (2002) and (2008)]. 
In the numerical simulations we also examined the case where individuals of all skill-levels are faced with 
the same migration costs. Our qualitative results remain robust to this specification.    6
Individuals share the same preferences. Following Diamond (1998), we simplify 
by assuming that preferences are represented by some quasi-linear utility function of the 
form: 
(1)  m d l h c d l c U ⋅ − − = ) ( ) , , ( , 
where c denotes consumption (gross of migration costs), l denotes labor, d is an indicator 
function assuming the value of one if the individual migrates and zero otherwise, and  ) (⋅ h  
is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
 4  
  For later purposes, as is common in the optimal tax literature, we reformulate the 
utility (gross of migration costs) and represent it as a function of gross income (y), net 
income (c) and the individual’s skill-level (w): 
(2)  ( , , ) ( / ) V w c y c h y w ≡ − . 
Hence, utility (net of migration costs) is given by:  
(2’)  ( , , , ) ( , , ) U w c y d V w c y d m ≡ − ⋅ . 
  As we assume that the majority of the population (in each country) is of low skill, 
it is plausible to assume that each government will resort to some re-distributive policy 
towards  the  low-skill  individuals.  Thus,  we  assume,  applying  median-voter 
considerations,  that  the  government  of  each  country  will  maximize  a  Rawlsian  social 
welfare function; that is, the utility of a representative low-skill resident.   
 
3.  The Government Problem 
We turn next to formulate the government problem. For concreteness we will focus on 
country i=1, that takes as given the fiscal policy (tax and transfer system) implemented by 
country  i=2.  We  will  then  solve  for  the  symmetric  Nash  equilibrium  of  the  fiscal-
                                                            
4  For technical reasons,  we  make two additional assumptions. First,  we assume that the term ℎ  /ℎ′ is 
(weakly) decreasing with respect to l. This assumption is satisfied, for instance, when h is iso-elastic, which 
is the functional form used in our simulations and is commonly used in the literature [see Diamond (1998), 
Salanie (2003) and Simula and Trannoy (2010), amongst others]. In addition, we assume that ℎ′′′ ≥ 0. 
When h is iso-elastic, the assumption implies that the (constant) elasticity of labor supply is bounded above 
by unity, which is consistent with empirical evidence [see, e.g., Salanie (2003)].    7
competition  game  formed  between  the  two  countries.  We  first  introduce  some  useful 
notation. Denote by  ij α  the measure of individuals of skill-level j in country i. Denote by 
  ij V the utility level (gross of migration costs) derived by an individual of skill level j in 
country i. Finally denote by  ij ij y c   and     , correspondingly, the net income and gross income 
chosen by an individual of skill level j in country i.  
  By  virtue  of  our  quasi-linear  specification,  a  high-skill  individual  who  incurs 
mobility cost m  will migrate from country i=2 if, and only if, the following condition 
holds: 
(3)  12 22 V m V − ≥  
Denote by 
*
12 22 m V V ≡ − , the cost of migration incurred by the high-skill individual who 
is  just  indifferent  between  staying  in  country  2  or  migrating  to  country  1.  Thus,  any 
individual incurring a cost of migration lower than or equal to the above threshold will 
migrate  to  country  1.  Recalling  our  assumption  that  migration  cost  is  distributed 






 represents the extent of migration of high-skill individuals between the two 
countries. If the term is positive there is migration from country 2 to country 1, and vice-
versa.   
Clearly, a more generous policy of the government in country i=1 towards high-
skill individuals will attract more high-skill migration, ceteris paribus, and vice versa. In 
a symmetric equilibrium no migration will take place (
* 0 m = ), hence,  1 2 / 2 j j j α α α = = . 
  The  Rawlsian  government  in  country  i=1  is  seeking  to  maximize  the  utility 
derived by a representative low-skill individual; namely: 
(4)  ) , , ( 11 11 1 y c w V W = , 
subject  to  the  following  two  self-selection/incentive  compatibility  constraints  (for  the 
low-skill individual and the high-skill individual, respectively), ensuring that each type of 
individual is as well-off with his bundle as he would be with mimicking the other type:  
(5)  1 11 11 1 12 12 ( , , ) ( , , ) V w c y V w c y ≥ ,   8
(6)  2 12 12 2 11 11 ( , , ) ( , , ) V w c y V w c y ≥ ; 
a resource constraint: 
(7)  1 1 1 ( ) j j j j y c R α ⋅ − ≥ ∑ , 
where  R  denotes  the  (pre-determined)  level  of  government  revenue  needs;
5 and,  a 
migration  condition,  which  (endogenously)  determines  the  number  of  high-skill 
individuals in country 1:  
(8)  [ ] 12 2 2 12 12 22
1
1/ 2 ( , , ) . V w c y V α α
δ
  = ⋅ + ⋅ −    
6 
  Note, that unlike the standard formulation of the optimal tax problem, the number 
of high-skill individuals is endogenously determined, rather than being a fixed parameter. 
The standard case of no migration is obtained for the special limiting case where change:
δ =∞. In this case, by virtue of (8), it follows that the number of individuals of each skill 
level is given by  2 / j α . Each government takes the tax policy of the other country as 
given, i.e., country 1 takes  22 V , the utility derived by the high-skill individuals in country 
2, as given when choosing its tax policy. We will look for a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
for the fiscal-competition game between the two countries. Note that symmetry implies 
that in equilibrium the same tax schedule will be implemented by both countries. 
3.1  Characterization of the Optimal Policy 
                                                            
5 Note that when R>0, the equilibrium for the fiscal competition game between the two countries (to be 
characterized below) exists only for values of δ sufficiently bounded away from zero. To avoid this (purely 
technical) complication and to enhance the clarity of our presentation  without changing the qualitative 
nature of our results, we will henceforth focus on the case where the fiscal-system is purely re-distributive 
(R=0). Note further, that setting R>0 does in fact strengthen our key results, by making the case for a flat 
system stronger.  
6  The formulation of the condition in equation (8) implicitly assumes an interior solution; namely, only a 
fraction of the high-skill population migrates in equilibrium. Notice, that in the symmetric equilibrium for 
the tax competition game between the two (identical) countries (to be characterized in what follows), no 
migration will actually take place. Thus, the necessary first-order (stability) conditions for each country 
(stating that no country will gain by deviating from the symmetric equilibrium profile) will indeed refer to 
an interior allocation. Notice further that as low-skill individuals cannot migrate, by assumption, it follows 
that  11 1 / 2 α α = .   9
We turn next to characterize the solution for the government problem. It is straightforward 
to prove that the revenue constraint has to bind in the optimum.
7 Turning next to the two 
self-selection constraints, one can show that our formulation differs from the standard 
optimal tax setting with no migration, in that it may well be the case that in the optimal 
solution both self-selection constraints will not bind. Thus, in addition to the standard 
efficiency at the top property, we may well obtain no distortion at the bottom. We first 
state a result due to Piaser (2007), demonstrating that the patterns of binding self-selection 
constraints  crucially  hinge  on  the  level  of  migration  costs  (all  proofs  and  formal 
derivations are relegated to the Appendix).  
Proposition 1 : There exists some critical level of migration costs, above which the high-
skill self-selection constraint is binding, and below which both self-selection constraints 
are not binding. In the former case, only the marginal tax rate at the top is zero; in the 
latter case, the marginal tax rate at both the top and the bottom is zero. 
Proof: See Appendix A.  
According to proposition 1, when migration costs are sufficiently large (but still bounded 
away from infinity), the standard result in the literature applies; namely  the incentive 
compatibility constraint associated with the high-skill individuals binds. However, when 
migration costs are small enough (but still bounded away from zero), both self-selection 
constraints  do  not  bind.  To  see  the  intuition  for  this  result,  recall  that  an  egalitarian 
government  seeking  to  redistribute  wealth  from  the  high-skill  towards  the  low-skill 
residents is essentially faced with two challenges. The first one is the standard one on the 
intensive margin (which applies in the case of an autarky, as well) and derives from the 
mimicking  threat  of  high  skill  individuals.  The  second  one  on  the  extensive  margin 
(which applies only when tax competition takes place) derives from the migration threat 
of high-skill residents. With large enough migration costs, the impact of the extensive 
margin  consideration  (the  potential  threat  of  a  massive  migration  of  the  high-skill)  is 
relatively  small;  hence,  the  standard  result  (as  in  the  case  of  autarky)  applies.  When 
migration costs are small enough the migration threat kicks in, in-earnest. Although the 
                                                            
7 To see this, note that when the revenue constraint does not bind, the government may increase slightly the 
net income of both skill-levels by the same amount, thereby the utility of the low-skill individual, without 
violating  the  revenue  constraint  (by  continuity  considerations)  or  the  two  self-selection  constraints  (by 
construction).   10
government  can  increase  the  tax  burden  shifted  on  the  high-skill  residents  without 
inducing the latter to mimic, the reduction in the tax base due to the ensued migration is 
large enough to offset the gain from increasing the tax rate. The (lump-sum) tax levied on 
the  high-skill  residents  in  this  case  is  essentially  set  (optimally)  at  the  Laffer  level; 
namely, the tax is set so as to maximize the total revenues raised from the high-skill 
population (hence the total transfers granted to the low-skill population).
8 
 
3.2  Characterization of the Equilibrium 
We turn to solve the government problem. By virtue of symmetry, it suffices to focus on 
country 1. Formulating the Lagrangean yields  
(9) 
[ ] 1 11 11 2 12 12 2 11 11
12 1 1 11 11 11
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
( ) ( ) , j j
L V w c y V w c y V w c y




  + ⋅ − + ⋅ −  
 
where 0  λ ≥ (=0, when the incentive constraint is not binding, for small enough migration 
costs, as shown in proposition 1 above) and  0 µ >  denote, correspondingly, the Lagrange 
multipliers  associated  with  the  high-skill  individual  self-selection  constraint  and  the 
government revenue constraint,   12 α  is given by the condition in (8) and  11 1 / 2 α α = , by 
virtue of the assumption that low-skill individuals cannot migrate.  
The first-order conditions are given by: 
11 (10)   1 0 λ µ α − − ⋅ = , 
11 11 12 11 11 (11)    / / 0 V y V y λ µ α ∂ ∂ − ⋅∂ ∂ + ⋅ = , 
12 2 12 12 (12)    [ / ( )] 0 y c λ µ α α δ + − + ⋅ − = , 
(13)   12 12 12 2 12 12 12 12 / [ / / ( )] 0 V y V y y c λ µ α α δ ⋅∂ ∂ + + ⋅∂ ∂ ⋅ − = . 
The optimal policy is given by a solution to the system of 7 equations [the four first-order 
conditions given in (10)-(13) and the three constraints in (6)-(8)]. When the self-selection 
                                                            
8  The lump-sum tax naturally introduces no distortions at the intensive margin, but being country-specific, 
does affect the decision on the extensive margin (whether or not to migrate). In this sense, the allocation 
attained in equilibrium is not first-best efficient.     11
constraint  in  not  binding,  0 λ =  (the  constraint  is  dropped)  and  the  optimal  policy  is 
obtained as a solution to a system of 6 equations. 
  We let  
^ ^ ^ ^
11 22 11 22 12 22 12 22 ( ), ( ), ( )  and   ( ) c V y V c V y V  denote the optimal solution for the 
government problem in country 1 as a function of the utility derived by the high-skill 
individuals in country 2,  22 V . A symmetric equilibrium for the game between the two 
countries is given by the implicit solution to the following equation: 
(14) 
^ ^
12 2 12 22 12 22 22 [ , ( ),  ( )] V V w c V y V V ≡ = . 
In the symmetric equilibrium, by construction, the tax schedules implemented by both 
countries are identical and, therefore, no migration takes place. The tax schedule offered 
in equilibrium by country i=1 (and country i=2, by symmetry) is given by the 4-tuple: 
^ ^ ^ ^
22 22 22 22 11 11 12 12 ( ), ( ), ( )  and   ( ) c V y V c V y V ,  where  22 V  is  the  implicit  solution  to  the 
condition given in (14).            
Employing  the  first-order  conditions  in  (10)-(13),  one  can  prove  the  following 
proposition:  
Proposition 2: There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium for the tax competition 
game between the two countries.   
Proof: See Appendix B. 
 
 3.3  The Effect of Migration on the Optimal Tax Schedule 
In  this  section  we  turn  to  investigate  the  effect  of  migration  on  the  properties  of  the 
optimal  tax  schedules  in  equilibrium.  For  this  purpose  we  conduct  comparative  static 
analysis with respect to the parameter δ  which measures the intensity of migration. The 
lower the parameter is the lower are the mobility costs incurred by migrants; hence, the 
stronger  are  the  migration  pressures.  The  following  proposition  summarizes  the 
comparative statics results: 
Proposition 3: In the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium for the game between the two-
countries, as mobility costs decrease: (i) the net transfers received by low-skill individuals 
as well as the net taxes paid by high-skill individuals decrease, (ii) the utility level of the   12
low-skill  individuals  decreases,  whereas  that  of  the  high-skill  individuals  increases. 
Furthermore, when migration costs are sufficiently large, the marginal tax rate levied on 
low-skill individuals increases with respect to δ .
9 
Proof: See Appendix D. 
The implications of proposition 3 are straightforward. Further integration of the world 
economy,  reflected  in  a  reduction  in  mobility  costs,  triggers  an  enhanced  fiscal 
competition between the two countries over mobile skilled-labor, which limits the scope 
of re-distributive policy. In the case where mobility costs are sufficiently large (in which 
the incentive constraint of the high-skill individuals is binding) the reduction in mobility 
costs would induce a ‘flattening’ of the tax schedule; that is, reduced differences in the 
marginal tax rates across income levels. The intuition for this result is as follows. As 
mobility  costs  decrease,  governments  offer  less  generous  welfare  policies  to  avoid 
emigration of high-skill individuals to the other country.
10 This implies that there is a 
lower incentive for the high-skill individuals to ‘mimic’ their low-skill counterparts in 
order to be eligible for welfare benefits, hence a lower need to impose a relatively high 
marginal tax rate at the bottom to deter such mimicking. Notice that in the case where 
mobility costs are small enough, as both incentive constraints do not bind; hence, there 
are no distortions either at the top or at the bottom, the marginal tax rate levied on both 
types of individuals is constantly zero, for any level of migration costs. 
 
4.  A  Linear Tax Schedule 
In  this  section  we  re-consider  the  tax  competition  game  between  the  two  countries 
assuming, now, that tax systems are restricted to be linear. This restriction implies, in 
particular, that transfers are accorded on a universal basis rather than being means-tested, 
                                                            
9    Proposition 3 summarizes the comparative-static properties of the (unique) symmetric equilibrium. 
Unlike the symmetric equilibrium that exists for any level of migration costs, one can show (see Appendix 
C for details) that for sufficiently small levels of migration costs, no a-symmetric equilibrium exists.   
10  Notice that by virtue of the substitutability between the skill levels in the production function, migration 
of the high-skill does not affect the productivity of the low-skill (the standard brain-drain argument in the 
migration literature) but rather gives rise to a sort of ‘fiscal brain-drain’ effect through the erosion of the tax 
base of the government, thereby limiting the extent of re-distribution attained by the progressive tax-and-
transfer system.   13
as in the non-linear system. We first examine the effects of migration on the equilibrium 
and then turn (in the coming section) to compare the optimal linear tax schedule with the 
optimal non-linear system (characterized in the previous section).     
We  denote  by  t  and  T,  respectively,  the  (constant)  marginal  tax  rate  and  the 
(universal) demo-grant set by the government in country i=1 (taking as given the linear 
tax system in country i=2).  We further denote by  1 1 ( , )  and   ( , ) j j y t T t T α , respectively, 
the gross income level chosen by a j-type individual and the number of j-type individuals 
residing  in  country  i=1.
11 Maintaining  our  notation  from  the  previous  sections,  the 
government  is  faced  with  the  following  revenue  constraint  (where  we  simplify  by 
omitting the tax arguments to abbreviate notation):  
(15)  ( ) 11 11 12 12 11 12 ( ) 0 t y y T α α α α ⋅ + − + ≥ .  
Denoting by  1 ( , , ) j V w t T , the maximal utility derived by a j-type individual (in country 
i=1) faced with the linear tax system, (t, T), the government is seeking to maximize the 
well-being of the low-skill individual,  11 ( , , ) V w t T , subject to the revenue constraint in 
(15).  
It  is  straightforward  to  verify  that  the  revenue  constraint  in  (15)  is  binding. 
Otherwise,  the  government  could  slightly  increase  the  lump-sum  transfer,  thereby 
increasing the utility of the low-skill individuals. Attracting high-skill migrants (due to the 
higher  demo-grant  offered)  will  further  expand  the  tax  base  and  allow  for  enhanced 
redistribution. As in the previous sections we look for a symmetric Nash equilibrium for 
the game between the two countries.  
Re-formulating  the  Lagrangean  of  the  government  problem  (in  country  i=1) 
yields: 
(16)  ( ) 1 11 11 12 12 11 12 ( , , ) ( ) L V w t T t y y T λ α α α α   ≡ + ⋅ + − +   , 
                                                            
11   1 1  is given by the implicit solution to the individual first-order condition:  (1 ) '( / ). j j j j y w t h y w ⋅ − =  It  is 
straightforward to verify, by full differentiation of the first order condition with respect to the tax rate, t, 
employing the properties of the utility function ( '' 0, ''' 0 h h > ≥ ), that: 
2 2
1 1 / 0 and  / 0 j j y t y t ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ ≤ . We 
will make use of these properties in the formal arguments in appendices E and F.    14
where  λ  denotes  the  multiplier  associated  with  the  government  budget  constraint. 
Employing the migration condition in (8), modified to the case of the linear tax regime, 
the first-order conditions with respect to the two tax parameters (t and T) are given by: 
(17) 
12
11 2 12 11 12 2 12
11 11 11 12 12 12 0
V V y y V
ty t y t y T
t t t t t
α α
λ α α α α
δ δ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   + + + + + − =   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
, 
(18)  ( )
2 12 2
11 12  1 0
ty T α α
λ α α
δ δ
  + − − + =    
. 
Employing the first-order conditions in (17) and (18), one can show that there exists a 
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium for the game between the two countries. Formally, 
Proposition  4:  When  both  countries  are  restricted  to  linear  tax  schedules,  a  unique 
symmetric  Nash  equilibrium  for  the  tax-competition  game  between  the  two  countries 
exists. 
Proof: see Appendix E. 
The following proposition characterizes the effect of migration on the properties of the 
optimal linear tax schedules in equilibrium.   
Proposition 5: In the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium for the game between the two-
countries, as mobility costs decrease: (i) the lump-sum transfer decreases, (ii) the tax rate 
decreases and (iii) the utility level of the low-skill individuals decreases, whereas that of 
the high-skill individuals increases.  
Proof: see Appendix F.   
From proposition 5 it follows that a linear tax schedule has similar characteristics to a 
non-linear  tax  system.  Under  both  tax  systems,  a  decrease  in  the  costs  of  migration 
(reflecting an enhanced threat of high-skill migration) implies that the government has to 
offer a less generous welfare system to its low-skill residents.   
 
5.  Comparing the Non- Linear and Linear Tax Schedules 
Linear (flat) tax systems are commonly perceived to be much simpler and hence cheaper 
to administer (enhanced compliance, lower extent of avoidance etc.) than non-linear ones   15
[see Hall and Rabushka (1985), for an elaborate discussion of the merits of flat systems]. 
Much of the criticism against a reform aiming at 'flattening' the tax system (say, through 
the consolidation of tax brackets and/or income sources) despite its well-known entailed 
administrative  gains,  dwells  on  its  perceived  limited  re-distributive  capacity.  A  linear 
system  accords  a  universal  demo-grant  across  the  board  and,  thus,  fails  to  employ 
screening devices (notably, means-testing) to enhance the target-efficiency  of the tax-
transfer  system.  In  this  section  we  demonstrate  that  in  the  backdrop  of  a  high-skill 
migration threat (due to a reduction of the migration costs faced by high-skill individuals), 
the re-distributive advantage of a non-linear system is significantly mitigated. Thus, in the 
presence of migration and in sharp contrast to the autarky case, a coordinated shift to a 
flat  system  (with  its  entailed  administrative  advantages),  still  allowing  for  fiscal 
competition between countries (by maintaining the countries' sovereignty over the welfare 
state generosity), may well prove to be mutually beneficial for both countries.
12   
One obvious case in which the advantage of the non-linear system (relative to a 
flat  one)  utterly  disappears  is  the  limiting  case  of  costless  migration.  With  costless 
migration ( 0) δ =  the redistributive system ultimately unravels under both tax regimes 
and  the  equilibrium  of  the  tax  competition  game  converges  to  the  laissez-faire 
(redistributive-free)  allocation  under  both  tax  systems  (a  standard  Bertrand-type 
competition argument). By continuity considerations, with sufficiently small migration 
costs, the welfare gain associated with a shift from a flat to a non-linear system is small 
enough  to  render  the  former  system  preferred  due  to  its  administrative  advantages. 
However, costless (or almost costless) migration is clearly an unrealistic paradigm for 
drawing concrete policy conclusions. We thus turn next to demonstrate that even in the far 
more plausible case where migration costs are sufficiently bounded away from zero, so 
that  the  extent  of  re-distribution  attained  (in  equilibrium)  is  substantial,  the  welfare 
difference between the two tax regimes is fairly small. Being unable to provide a closed-
form solution, we resort to numerical simulations, based on a calibrated version of the 
model.  
                                                            
12 Coordination can take different forms such as binding international agreements as part of a treaty (such as 
the  EU)  or  via  a  federal  system  in  which  the  restriction  can  be  imposed  on  the  states  by  the  federal 
authority.   16
  We make the following parametric assumptions for the numerical analysis. We 
follow  Simula  and  Trannoy  (2010)  in  assuming  that  the  utility  function  takes  the 
following  (iso-elastic)  functional  form: 
1 1/ ( / )




i i i i
y w





,  where  e  is 
measuring the labor supply (taxable income) elasticity. We calibrate the wage rates (of 
both types of individuals) and the proportion of high-skill workers, using data from the 
US  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  (BLS).  By  virtue  of  the  assumption  that  the  low-skill 
individuals form the majority of the population ( 2 1 α < ) it follows that the median wage 
rate  is  equal  to  the  wage  rate  earned  by  a  low-skill  individual,  1. med w w =  Using  the 
median  hourly  wage  rate  of  17.9 med w =  [National  Compensation  Survey  (2009)],  the 
elasticity of taxable income e=0.4 [Gruber and Saez (2002)] and assuming a constant tax 
rate of 40 percent [Saez (2002)], one can solve for the gross income level earned by a 
high-skill  individual.
13 The  mean  income,  22.36 mean y =  [Current  Population  Survey 





mean y y y
α α −   = + 
 
. In order to obtain the gross income earned 
by a high-skill individual, 2 y , we define high-skill (respectively, low-skill) workers as 
those  individuals  who  earn  above  (below)  the  mean  income  and,  accordingly,  set  the 
proportion of high-skill workers in the population at  2 / 2 α =0.3518 [Current Population 
Survey (2009)], in line with our assumption that the income distribution is right-skewed. 
We  then  solve  for  the  wage  rate  of  the  high-skill  individual  (employing  the  same 
parametric assumptions used above with respect to the elasticity of taxable income and 
the marginal tax rate in place) to obtain 2 45.645 w = . We turn next to discuss the results. 
Figure 1 below demonstrates the difference between the welfare levels associated 
with  equilibrium  of  the  tax  competition  game  under  the  two  tax  regimes  (non-linear 
versus linear)  as a function of the cost of migration. The difference between the two 
regimes is measured on the vertical axis in compensating-variation terms (as a fraction of 
the laissez-faire output).  As a guide to interpreting the figure, notice that in the limiting 
case of costless migration the welfare difference between the two tax regimes is equal to 
zero , as argued above. 
                                                            
13  Our estimated parameters are robust to the tax rate being used.   17
Figure 1 indicates that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the cost of 
migration and the difference in welfare levels between the two tax regimes. Starting from 
the  costless-migration  equilibrium  ( 0 δ = ),  as  the  cost  of  migration  increases,  the 
difference between the welfare levels associated with the two tax regimes increases (that 
is, the gain associated with shifting from a flat system to a non-linear one is rising). This 
pattern is maintained over some range up to some critical (sufficiently  high) level of 
migration costs (incidentally, the level at which the incentive constraint of the high-skill 
individual starts to bind; see the characterization in proposition 1). The increasing pattern 
reverses  itself,  for  values  of δ  higher  than  the  critical  level  (the  case  of  autarky  is 
captured by sufficiently high levels of migration costs).       
 
The  see  the  intuition  underlying  the  non-monotonic  relationship  exhibited  by 
figure 1, consider first the case where migration costs are sufficiently small in which none 
of the incentive constraints binds. Starting from the costless-migration case (in which no 
re-distribution  takes  place),  as  migration  costs  increase,  the  extent  or  re-distribution 
expands  (due  to  the  mitigated  threat  of  high-skill  migration)  under  both  tax  regimes. 
However, whereas re-distribution is being carried out through a (distortion-free) system of 
differential lump-sum transfers and taxes under the non-linear regime, attaining enhanced 
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Figure 1: Comparison between
the Non-linear and Linear Tax Regimes  18
hence, in the magnitude of the labor-leisure distortion entailed. Thus, as migration costs 
increase,  the  re-distributive  advantage  of  the  (efficient)  non-linear  system  over  the 
(distortive) linear regime becomes more manifest. Now consider the case where migration 
costs are sufficiently large, in which the incentive constraint of the high skill individual 
binds. Similar to the case of low migration costs, as migration costs increase, the extent of 
re-distribution expands under both tax regimes. However, whereas efficiency at the top 
(zero  marginal  tax  rate  levied  on  the  high-skill  individual)  is  maintained,  in  order  to 
ensure no mimicking by the high-skill individual (effective means-testing), as migration 
costs increase, the government has to raise the marginal tax rate imposed on the low-skill 
individuals.  The  entailed  distortion  at  the  bottom  limits  the  gains  from  enhanced  re-
distribution under the non-linear system; hence, the re-distributive advantage of the non-
linear system relative to the linear regime. When the distortion entailed at the bottom is 
large enough, the patterns reverse and the welfare difference between the two tax regimes 
decreases as migration costs rise. When the distortion at the bottom is small in magnitude 
(for instance, in the case where low/high-skill wage ratio is sufficiently high) the welfare 
difference  between  the  two  regimes  will  rise  monotonically  over  the  entire  range  of 
migration costs, but at a decreasing rate over the range in which the incentive constraint is 
binding (see Figure G1 in Appendix G). Our numerical analysis (see Appendix G) shows 
that the patterns exhibited by figure 1 remain robust to changes in the other parameters of 
the  model:  the  taxable-income  elasticity  (Figure  G2)  and  the  proportion  of  high-skill 
workers (Figure G3). 
Figure 2 below depicts the relationship between the welfare-difference  (on the 
vertical axis) measured, as in the previous figure, in compensating-variation terms (as a 
fraction of the laissez-faire output); and, the extent of re-distribution (on the horizontal 
axis), measured as the increase, in percentage terms, of the net income (consumption) of 
the low-skill individuals under a linear tax-regime relative to the laissez-faire benchmark.   19
 
Notice that the patterns are similar to those exhibited by figure 1. The figure indicates that 
for sufficiently small costs of migration, yet large enough to support a substantial amount 
of re-distribution, the welfare difference between the two-tax regimes is fairly small. For 
instance,  when  the  linear  tax  regime  attains  a  14.8  percent  increase  in  the  level  of 
consumption derived by the low-skill individuals relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium, 
the transfer (in consumption terms) that would be required to fully compensate the low-
skill individuals for a shift from a non-linear to a linear regime, measured as a fraction of 
the total output in the laissez-faire equilibrium, is less than 1 percent. . When the linear 
regime attains an increase of 19.3 percent in the low-skill level of consumption relative to 
the  level  attained  under  the  laissez-faire  equilibrium,  the  welfare  difference  in 
compensating-variation  terms  (as  a  fraction  of  the  laissez-faire  output)  is  less  than  2 
percent.  
To gain some perspective on the significant restraining impact tax competition 
bears on the extent of re-distribution in equilibrium (thereby on the welfare dominance of 
the non-linear tax regime), notice that when the linear regime attains an increase of 14.8 
percent in low-skill consumption level (relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium) in which 
case  the  welfare  difference  between  the  two  tax  regimes  (in  compensating-variation 
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Figure 2: The Two Tax Regimes
and the Extent of Re-distribution  20
17.7  percent.  In  contrast,  in  the  closed  economy  case  (with  no  migration)  the  linear 
regime attains an increase of 30 percent in low-skill consumption (relative to the laissez-
fair  benchmark),  the  welfare  difference  between  the  two  regimes  (in  compensating-
variation terms) is 6.6 percent of the laissez-fair output, and the flat tax rate is over 50 
percent.  
  Figure 2 illustrates that under plausible parametric assumptions the welfare gain 
associated with a shift from a linear system to a non-linear regime is fairly small, even 
when migration costs are sufficiently bounded away from zero to support a substantial 
amount of re-distribution in equilibrium. Notice that our result is in fact stronger than that 
inferred from the figure for several reasons. First, we assume a Rawlsain objective, which 
exhibits the strongest taste for re-distribution. Invoking a more moderate re-distributive 
objective is likely to enhance the restraining effect of tax competition on the entailed 
extent of re-distribution; thus, further narrowing the welfare difference between the two 
tax regimes. Second, allowing for migration of low-skill workers is likely to reduce the 
extent  of  re-distribution  attained  in  equilibrium  under  both  tax  regimes,  with  similar 
implications  to  those  driven  by  setting  a  less  egalitarian  objective.  Third,  in  practice, 
linear systems often allow for an exemption level (an income threshold below which the 
individual does not pay any taxes), which enhances the extent of re-distribution attained. 
Finally, a non-linear system which is by construction means-tested (unlike the universal 
linear regime) is often mired by compliance issues (notably, misreporting by agents that 
claim eligibility for transfers) and by low take-up rates, both of which reduce the effective 
extent of re-distribution attained under the non-linear regime. Taking into account all the 
above  considerations  is  likely  to  tilt  the  balance  in  favor  of  a  linear  system,  in  the 
presence of a sufficiently strong migration threat.   
 
6.  Stability of the Linear-Tax Equilibrium 
In the previous section we demonstrated that under plausible parametric assumptions, the 
gain associated with a coordinated shift (by both countries) from a flat tax regime to a 
non-linear one may be fairly small when migration threat is strong. In this section we 
consider  the  case  of  an  uncoordinated  (unilateral)  shift  by  one  of  the  two  countries. 
Starting from equilibrium in the case where both countries are  restricted to linear-tax 
regimes, we examine the gain associated with a unilateral shift by one of the two countries   21
to the optimal non-linear schedule. We maintain the same parametric assumption used in 
the previous calibrated simulations.  
Figure  3  below  depicts  the  relationship  between  the  gain  from  a  (unilateral) 
deviation from the linear-tax equilibrium to a non-linear schedule (on the vertical axis) 
measured, as in the previous figures, in compensating-variation terms (as a fraction of the 
laissez-faire output); and, the extent of re-distribution (on the horizontal axis), measured 
as the increase, in percentage terms, of the net income (consumption) of the low-skill 




As can be seen from the figure, even when the extent of re-distribution is fairly significant 
(20 percent increase in the low-skill consumption level under the linear regime relative to 
the laissez-faire benchmark) the gain from deviation amounts to less than 1 percent of 
laissez-faire output. This modest gain is likely to be more than offset by the additional 
administrative costs associated with a shift from a flat regime to a non-linear one. Thus, 
taking into account the administrative costs, the figure essentially illustrates the stability 






































0 5 10 15 20
consumption increase (in %)
When the Difference in CV is Less than 2%
Figure 3: Stability of the Linear Equilibrium  22
choose a general non-linear tax schedule (no coordination is imposed), an equilibrium 
where both countries optimally choose to set a flat system in place is likely to occur. As in 
the previous section, the crucial factor at play is the threat of high-skill migration that 
significantly reduces the gain from deviation. 
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
Linear (flat) tax systems are commonly perceived to be much simpler and hence cheaper 
to  administer  than  non-linear  ones.  Much  of  the  criticism  against  a  reform  aiming  at 
'flattening' the tax system (say, by consolidating tax brackets and/or income sources), 
despite its well-known entailed administrative gains, dwells on its perceived limited re-
distributive capacity. A linear system accords a universal demo-grant across the board 
and,  thus,  fails  to  employ  screening  devices  (notably,  means-testing)  to  enhance  the 
target-efficiency of the tax-transfer system. In this paper we employ a tax competition 
model  to  demonstrate  that  in  the  backdrop  of  a  high-skill  migration  threat  the  re-
distributive advantage of a non-linear system is significantly mitigated. In the presence of 
migration and in sharp contrast to the autarky case, a coordinated shift to a flat system 
(with  its  entailed  administrative  advantages),  may  be  warranted.  Furthermore,  we 
demonstrate that an equilibrium where both countries, free to choose a non-linear tax 
system, set a flat system in place, is likely to form when migration threat is sufficiently 
strong.      23
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 
We turn first to show that when migration costs are sufficiently large, the high-skill self- 
selection constraint is binding. Formally, there exists some threshold level of migration 
costs,  critical δ , such that for all critical δ δ > , the high-skill self-selection constraint is binding. 
Let  ( ) ( ) ( ) 12 11 12 11
* * * *
1 2 2 / / critical y y h y w h y w δ α = − − + ,  where 
1
*  
j y denotes  the  laissez-faire 
income level derived by an individual with skill-level j=1,2, given by the implicit solution 
to:
1
*   '( / )
j j j h y w w = .  Notice  that  the  threshold  level  is  well  defined  (positive)  by 
construction.  Suppose  by  negation  that  for  some  critical δ δ > the  high-skill  self-selection 
constraint  does  not  bind.  As  we  re-distribute  towards  the  low-skill  individuals,  it 
obviously  cannot  be  the  case  that  the  low-skill  self-selection  constraint  is  binding. 
Consider then the case where both self-selection constraints do not bind. In this case the 
government problem is given by the following Lagrangean: 
(A1)  1 11 11 1 1 1 ( , , ) ( ) j j j j L V w c y y c µ α   ≡ + ⋅ −   ∑ . 
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Notice that as both self-selection constraints do not bind (by our presumption) individuals 
of  both  skills  set  their  income  at  the  laissez-faire  levels.  Employing  the  symmetry 
property (as we characterize a symmetric equilibrium) and re-arranging the condition in 
(A4) yields:  
(A6) 




− = . 












= +  
 
.  
The high-skill self-selection constraint is, by assumption, satisfied as a strict inequality, 
and given by:  
(A8)
  ( ) ( )
12 11 12 11 2 2 / / 0 c c h y w h y w − − + > .  
Substituting for  11 12  and  c c  from (A6) and (A7) into (A8) yields:  
(A9)  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
12 11 12 11
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− − − − + >  
 
⇔ < − − + =
 
where the last inequality follows from our previous observation that 
*
1 1 j j y y = . We thus 
obtain a contradiction to the presumption that  critical δ δ < . 
We  turn  next  to  show  that  for  0 critical δ δ < <  both  self-selection  constraints  are  not 
binding. By the single-crossing property it cannot be the case that both constraints are 
binding. Moreover, as we re-distribute towards the low-skill individuals, it cannot be the 
case that only the low-skill incentive constraint is binding. We thus assume by negation, 
that only the high-skill self-selection constraint is binding.   
The government problem is given by the following Lagrangean: 
(A10)  [ ] 1 11 11 2 12 12 2 11 11 1 1 1 ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( ) , j j j j L V w c y V w c y V w c y y c λ µ α   ≡ + − + ⋅ −   ∑  
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 
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.  
By virtue of the government revenue constraint, it follows that:  
(A16) 
1
12 12 11 11
2
( ) ( ). y c y c
α
α
− = − −   
Substituting from (A16) into (A15) yields:  







< + .  
By virtue of (A16) and (A17), it follows that, 
(A18)     11 12 11 12
1
c c y y
δ
α
− < − +  .  
Substituting  for  the  term  11 12 c c −  from  (A18)  into  the  low-skill  (non-binding)  self-
selection constraint and re-arranging yields: 
(A19)     ( ) ( )
12 11 1 12 1 11 1 / / . y h y w y h y w δ α   > ⋅ − − +    
Now let  ( ) ( )
11 12 ( ) / / . F w h y w h y w ≡ −  As 
12 11 0 y y − >  and by virtue of the convexity of 







(A20)     ( ) ( )
12 12 11 1 2 11 2 / / . y h y w y h y w δ α   > ⋅ − − +    
By virtue of the efficiency-at-the-top property, 
12
*
12 y y = . Moreover, as 
* *
11 11 12 y y y < <  it 
follows that ( ) ( )
11 11
* *
11 2 11 2 / / y h y w y h y w − < − . It therefore follows that: 
( ) ( )
12 12 11 11
* * * *
1 2 2 (A21)      / / . y h y w y h y w δ α   > ⋅ − − +     
Thus, we obtain a contradiction to our presumption that critical δ δ < .   26
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2 
We consider first the case where migration costs are sufficiently large, so that, by virtue 
of proposition 1, the self-selection constraint associated with the high-skill individuals is 
binding. The Largangean for the government problem is given by: 
(B1)  [ ] 1 11 11 2 12 12 2 11 11 1 1 1 ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( ) j j j j L V w c y V w c y V w c y y c λ µ α   ≡ + − + ⋅ −   ∑ . 
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. 
Employing (B2), (B4) and the government revenue constraint, following some algebraic 
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By  virtue  of  the  efficiency  at  the  top, 
*
12 12 y y = ,  the  level  of  income  chosen  under  a 
laissez-faire  regime.  Thus,  equilibrium  is  given  by  the  solution  to  the  system  of  two 
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 ,  by  virtue  of  the 
assumption that  ''' 0 h ≥ . Thus, by virtue of (B10) it follows that







.   
Denote the solutions to (B6) and (B9) by ( ) 1 f λ  and ( ) 2 , f λ δ , respectively. Note that as 
the  expression  in  (B9)  is  strictly  concave  in 11 y ,  there  are  potentially  two  implicit 
solutions, but as the optimal tax schedule implies that the marginal tax rate levied on the 
low-skill individual is strictly positive, the only feasible solution is the smaller value of 
the two candidate solutions.  
Now let ) , ( ) ( ) , ( 2 1 δ λ λ δ λ f f f − ≡ . We next show that 2 (0, ) 0 and  [ / 2, ] 0 f f δ α δ > < . 
We turn first to establish that (0, ) 0 f δ > . To see this note first that by virtue of (B6), 









; hence,  ( )
*
1 11 0 f y = . It suffices to show that ( )
*
2 11 0, f y δ < . 
To  see  this,  note  that  by  virtue  of  (B9),  setting  0 λ =  implies  that
12 11 12 2 11 2
1
( / ) ( / ) 0 y y h y w h y w
δ
α
− + − − + = .    28
Thus,  ( ) 1 12 12 2 11 11 2 ( / ) ( / ) y h y w y h y w δ α = ⋅ − − + .  
Recalling that  critical δ δ <  (where the critical delta is defined in the proof of proposition 1) 
implies:  
( ) ( )
12 12 11 11 12 12 11 11
11 11 11 11 11 11
* * * * * *
1 2 2 1 2 2
* * *
2 2
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
( / ) ( / )
y h y w y h y w y h y w y h y w
y h y w y h y w y y
α α − − + < − − +
⇔ − < − ⇔ <
 
We turn next to establish that 2 [ / 2, ] 0 f α δ < . To see this note first that by virtue of (B6), 
setting  2 / 2 λ α =  and  recalling  that ( )
*
1 11 0 f y =  implies,  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that









1 2 11 [ /2] f y α < .  Substituting  2 / 2 λ α =  into  (B9)  implies  that 
* * *
12 12 2 11 11 2 2 2 12 ( / ) ( / ) 0 ( / 2, ) . y h y w y h y w f y α δ − − + = ⇔ = Thus,  2 [ / 2, ] 0 f α δ < . 
By the continuity of f it follows, by virtue of the intermediate value theorem, that there 
exists  some 2 ' (0, / 2) λ α ∈ ,  such  that 0 ) ' ( = λ f .  Moreover,  it  follows  that
*
1 1 ) ' ( y f < λ . 
Thus, we have proved existence and the solution is well defined (satisfies the condition 
that the marginal tax rate on the low-skill individual is positive at the optimum). 
We turn next to prove uniqueness. Differentiating the expression in (B9) with respect to 

















λ α α λ
    ∂
  = >    ∂ −   
  ∂
= − − ⋅ <   ∂  
  
where the last inequality follows from 
* *














∂ ∂ = − >
∂ ∂
∂
   29
Uniqueness  follows,  as 2 1   and   decreasing   is   f f is  increasing.  Hence,  both  schedules 
intersect only once. 
We consider next the case where migration costs are small enough, so that both self-
selection constraints do not bind. Formulating the Lagrangean for this case yields: 
(B12)  1 11 11 12 1 1 11 11 11 ( , , ) ( ) ( ) j j L V w c y y c y c µ α α   ≡ + ⋅ − + ⋅ −   ,  
where  µ  denotes  the  Lagrange  multiplier  associated  with  the  government  budget 
constraint. The first-order conditions are given by: 
































+ ⋅ ⋅ − =
∂
. 
By substituting from (B13) into (B14) and re-arranging, one obtains: 
(B17)  11 11 / 1 V y ∂ ∂ = . 
By substituting from (B15) into (B16) and re-arranging, one obtains: 
(B18)  12 12 / 1 V y ∂ ∂ = . 




j y ; j=1,2, are the efficient laissez-faire ones, given by the implicit solution 
to:  1 1 / 1 j j V y ∂ ∂ = . 
Substituting  for  12 2 / 2 α α =  into  (B15),  by  virtue  of  the  construction  of  a  symmetric 








= − ,   30
By substituting for the term 
*
12 12 y c − from (B19) into the government (binding) revenue 









= + . 
The symmetric equilibrium is uniquely defined by the 8-tuple: 
* and  ,  , 1,2,  ij ij y c i j = with 
* *
1 2 1 2  and  j j j j y y c c = = , where
*  
ij y denotes the laissez-faire gross income level derived by 
an individual with skill-level j=1,2 in country i=1,2; and  ij c  denotes the net income level 
derived by an individual with skill-level j=1,2 in country i=1,2, given by the expressions 
on right-hand side of (B19) and (B20).   
Notice that when δ=0;  namely, in the case of costless migration, the equilibrium naturally 
converges to the laissez-faire allocation, given by:
*
1 1   , 1,2 j j c y j = = . 
 
Appendix C: Non-existence of Asymmetric Equilibria 
In what follows we prove that when migration costs are sufficiently small; hence, the 
incentive  constraint  of  the  high-skill  individuals  is  not  binding,  there  exists  no  a-
symmetric Nash equilibrium for the tax competition game between the two countries. 
Formulating the first-order conditions for the program solved by country i, i=1,2, yields:  
1 1 1 1 ( 1)   1 [ / ( )] 0 i i i i C y c µ α α δ + − + ⋅ − = , 
1 1 1 ( 2)    / 0 i i i i C V y µ α ∂ ∂ + ⋅ = , 
2 2 2 2 ( 3)    [ / ( )] 0 i i i i C y c µ α α δ ⋅ − + ⋅ − = , 
(C4)   2 2 2 2 2 2 [ / / ( )] 0 i i i i i V y y c µ α α δ + ⋅∂ ∂ ⋅ − = . 




2 i y y = , 
where  
*
2 y  denotes the laissez-faire gross level of income chosen by type-2 individual.   31
By virtue of (C5) it follows that the difference between the utility levels derived by a 
high-skill individual residing in countries i and j, respectively, is given by:   
(C6)  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ( , , ) ( , , ) i i j j i j V w c y V w c y c c − = − .  
Substituting from (C6) into the migration condition given in (8), in the main text, yields: 
(C7)
  ( ) 2 2 2 2 1/ 2 1/ i i j c c α α δ   = ⋅ + ⋅ −   .  
In an asymmetric equilibrium  2 2 i j α α ≠ ; hence, with no loss of generality, we henceforth 
assume that, 12 22 α α > . By virtue of (C7) it follows that  12 22 c c > .  
A  necessary  condition  for  a  Nash  equilibrium  to  exist  is  that  either  one  of  the  two 
countries  cannot  attain  a  fiscal  surplus  by  slightly  modifying  the  net  income 
(consumption)  level  derived  by  a  typical  high-skill  individual  (leaving  all  other  tax 
parameters unchanged). Notice that by slightly increasing or decreasing the net income 
level  derived  by  the  high-skill  individuals,  none  of  the  two  incentive  constraints  is 
violated, as both are satisfied as strict inequalities when migration costs are small enough. 
Differentiating the revenue constraint (in countries 1 and 2, respectively) with respect to 
the corresponding net income (consumption) level derived by the high-skill individual 
yields the following two conditions that necessarily hold in equilibrium: 
(C8)  ( ) ( )
* * 2 2




⋅ − − = ⇔ ⋅ − = ,  
(C9)  ( ) ( )
* * 2 2




⋅ − − = ⇔ ⋅ − = .  
By subtracting (C9) from (C8) and re-arranging, it follows that: 
(C10)  ( ) ( ) ( )
* * 2 2 2
2 12 2 22 12 22 22 12 12 22 y c y c c c
α α α
α α α α
δ δ δ
⋅ − − ⋅ − = − → − = −  
From (C7) it also follows that: 
(C11)    ( ) ( ) ( ) 12 22 12 22 22 12 12 22 1/ 1/ 2/ c c c c c c α α δ δ δ − = ⋅ − − ⋅ − = ⋅ −  
By substituting from (C11) into (C10) it follows that:   32
(C12)   ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2




− = ⋅ − ⇔ + − =  
Thus, we obtain a contradiction to our presumption that  12 22 c c > . This completes the 
proof. 
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 3 
We  consider  first  the  case  where  migration  costs  are  sufficiently  large;  hence,  the 
incentive  constraint  of  the  high-skill  individual  is  binding.  We  first  prove  that  in 
equilibrium,  the  marginal  tax  rate  levied  on  the  low-skill  individuals  increases  with 
respect toδ . As shown in Appendix B, the unique equilibrium for the game between the 
two countries is given by the (unique feasible) solution to the following system of two 
equations: 









  ∂ ∂
≡ − + + =   ∂ ∂  
,  
(D2)  ( ) ( ) [ ]
12 12
* * 1
11 2 11 2 11
1 2
2
, , 1 ( , ) ( , ) 0
2 1




   




12 y denotes the laissez-faire income level associated with the high-skill individual 
(efficiency at the top property).  
Fully differentiating (D1) and (D2) with respect to δ  yields: 



















































( / ) ( / )
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
y H J
H J y H y J
λ δ
δ λ λ
∂ ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂
.    33
We turn next to sign the expression on the right-hand side of (D5). Note first, that by 



















   
− <      −   






.  We  conclude  that  the  expression  in  the 
numerator on the right-hand side of (D5) is positive. Turning next to the expression on the 
denominator on the right-hand side of (D5), it follows, by virtue of our earlier derivations 






















 .  Thus,  the  expression  in  the 






The (implicit) marginal tax rate levied on the low-skill individual is given by: 









MRT ∂ ∂ + =
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
+ = . 
Differentiation with respect to δ  yields: 
(D7)  0 ) / ( ) / ( 11
2
11 11








where the last inequality follows from (D5) and the convexity of h.  
Thus, indeed, as δ decreases, the marginal tax rate levied on the low-skill individuals 
decreases.  
 We turn next to prove that when δ decreases the net transfers received by the 
low-skill  individuals  decrease  (correspondingly,  by  virtue  of  the  balanced  budget 
constraint of the government, the net taxes paid by the high-skill individuals decrease as 
well). Suppose by way of contradiction that as δ  decreases, the term  ) ( 11 11 y c −  weakly 
increases. Formally, 
(D8)  . 0






To satisfy the government budget constraint [given in (7)] it necessary follows that,   34
(D9)  . 0






By virtue of the ‘efficiency at the top’ property, the gross income received by the high-
skill individual does not change in response to the decrease inδ . Hence, 







Combining (D9) and (D10) implies that, 
(D11)  . 0




w y h c
 
By virtue of the binding self-selection constraint [given in (7)] it follows that, 
(D12) 
, 0 ] 1 ) / 1 ( ) / ( ' [
) (
) / 1 ( ) / ( ' 0





11 2 11 11















w w y h
y y c
y
w w y h
c w y h c
δ δ
δ δ δ  
where the last inequality follows from (D5) and the fact that 
* *
11 11 12 y y y < < , where 
*
1 , j y  
j=1,2, denotes the laissez-faire level of income chosen by a j-type individual. 
Comparing (D8) and (D12), one obtains the desired contradiction.  
Finally, we turn to prove that the utility level of the high-skill individuals (respectively, 
that of the low-skill individuals) is decreasing (increasing) with respect to δ . We first 
consider the high-skill individuals. Differentiation with respect to δ  yields: 
(D13)  δ δ
δ
∂ ∂ ⋅ ⋅ − ∂ ∂ =
∂
∂
/ ) / 1 ( ) / ( ' / 12 2 2 12 12
12 y w w y h c
V
. 







We turn next to the low-skill individuals. With slight abuse of notation, denote by  ) ( 1 δ j V  
the utility derived by an individual of skill-level j in country i=1 (and hence in country 
i=2)  in  equilibrium  as  a  function  of  δ .  Further  denote  by ) (   and   ) ( 1 1 δ δ j j y c ,  the 
corresponding net income and gross income levels of an individual of skill level j in   35
country i=1. Now suppose by way of contradiction, that as δ  increases, the utility derived 
by a low-skill individual in equilibrium is weakly decreasing. Formally, 
(D14)  0 / ) / 1 ( ) / ( ' / 11 1 1 11 11





y w w y h c
V
. 
We  turn  to  show  that  if  the  condition  in  (D14)  holds,  then  choosing  the  bundles
2 , 1 )); ( ), ( ( 1 1 = j y c j j δ δ ,  is  not  a  best-response  for  country  i=1.  To  see  this,  fix  some 
arbitrary δ ,  and  consider  a  deviation  to  an  alternative  tax  schedule  given  by
2 , 1 )); ' ( ), ' ( ( 1 1 = j y c j j δ δ ,  where  0 '> −δ δ  and  is  arbitrarily  small.  Clearly,  by 
construction,  the  self-selection  constrains  are  satisfied  under  the  new  tax  schedule. 
Moreover,  the  self-selection  constraint  of  the  high-skill  individual  [given  in  (7)]  is 
satisfied as equality. We turn to show that such a deviation creates a fiscal surplus. Let 
) ' , ( δ δ Ω  denote the fiscal surplus of the government in country 1, when the migration 
costs are δ , and the government in country 1 deviates to the alternative tax schedule,
2 , 1 )); ' ( ), ' ( ( 1 1 = j y c j j δ δ .  Note  that  by  construction,  0 ) , ( = Ω δ δ .  Formally,  we  need  to 
show that  0 ) ' , ( > Ω δ δ . Taking a first-order approximation, we need to show that: 
(D15)  0
'
) ' , (
) ' (
'
) ' , (





⋅ − − =
∂
Ω ∂
⋅ − − Ω = Ω





δ δ δ δ δ δ  




1 11 11 2 12 12
'
2 12 12 12
( , ')
/ 2 ( / / ) / 2 ( / / )
'
                           / ( / ) ( ) 0.









= ⋅ ∂ ∂ −∂ ∂ + ⋅ ∂ ∂ −∂ ∂
∂
+ ⋅ ∂ ∂ ⋅ − <
  
Consider first the first term in brackets on the right-hand side of (D16). By virtue of the 
binding budget constraint (which holds for anyδ  in equilibrium) this term is equal to 







, hence this term is negative. We have established, therefore, that some deviation 
from the best-response  (by  presumption) tax schedule results in a fiscal surplus. This 
surplus can be used to attain a Pareto improvement. We obtain the desired contradiction.    36
We  turn  next  to  the  case  where  migration  costs  are  low  enough  (hence,  the 
incentive-constraint of the high-skill individuals does not bind). As shown in Appendix B 
[see  conditions  (B19)  and  (B20)],  in  this  case,  the  net  income  (consumption)  levels 

















= + , 




j y ; j=1,2, are the efficient laissez-faire ones, given by the implicit solution 
to:  1 1 / 1 j j V y ∂ ∂ = . 
It directly  follows from conditions (D17) and (D18) that the net transfers (net 
taxes) received (paid) by the low-skill (respectively, high skill) individuals increase with 
respect  to  mobility  costs;  and,  correspondingly,  the  utility  derived  by  the  low-skill 
(respectively, high-skill) individuals is increasing (decreasing) with respect to mobility 
costs. This completes the proof. 
 
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 4 
In proving the proposition we will repeatedly use the following simple lemma: 
Lemma: (i)  1 / 0 j y t ∂ ∂ < , (i) 
2 2
1 / 0 j y t ∂ ∂ ≤ . 
Proof:  Follows    straightforward  from  differentiation  of  the  individual  first-order 
condition,  1 '( / ) (1 ) j j h y w w t = ⋅ − ,  with  respect  to  t,  employing  the  properties  of  the 
function h ( ''' 0  and   '' 0 h h ≥ > ). 
Employing  the  first-order  conditions  in  (17)  and  (18),  the  equilibrium  for  the  game 
between  the  two  countries  is  given  by  the  solution  to  the  following  system  of  three 
equations (for the three unknowns, t, T andλ ):   37
(E1) 
12
11 2 12 11 12 2 12
11 11 11 12 12 12 0,
V V y y V
ty t y t y T
t t t t t
α α
λ α α α α
δ δ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   + + + + + − =   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
   
(E2)  ( )
2




  + − − =    
 
(E3)    ( ) 11 11 12 12 11 12 ( ) 0. t y y T α α α α ⋅ + − + =  
Let A denote the effect of an increase in t on the government budget constraint in a closed 
economy (that is, in the absence of migration). Formally,  
(E4) 
1 11 2 12
11 12 2 2
y y
A t y t y
t t
α α     ∂ ∂
= + + +     ∂ ∂    
. 









α ⋅ ⋅ −
− =
 
Substituting for T from (E5) into (E2) and re-arranging yields: 
( )
12 2 1 11
2
(E6)      .





− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −
 
Substituting from (E4)-(E6) into (E1) and re-arranging yields: 
(E7)  ( ) ( )
( ) 2 1 12 11 11 12




t y y V V
F t A
t t y y t
α α δ
δ
δ α α δ
   ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ∂ ∂
≡ + + =      ∂ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ∂    
  
We turn first to prove existence.  
Substituting t=0 into (E7), employing the individual optimization envelope condition and 
re-arranging, yields: 











= > , 
where
*
1 , 1,2 j y j = , denotes the laissez-faire level of income chosen by a j-type individual. 
Substituting t=1 into (E7), noting that in this case,  1 0, 1,2 j y j = = , it follows:   38
(E9)  ( )
1 11 2 12 1, 0
1 1 2 2
y y
F




= ⋅ + ⋅ <
= = ∂ ∂
,   
where the sign of the inequality follows from part (i) of the lemma. 
Existence  follows  then  by  the  continuity  of  F  in  t,  employing  the  intermediate  value 
theorem. The linear system is indeed progressive (0<t<1) as expected. 
We turn next to prove uniqueness by showing that
( , )
0









will then follow by the continuity of F in t. 
By differentiating (E6) with respect to t and re-arranging, one obtains: 
(E10) 
( ) ( ) 12





2 2 t t y y
δ α α φ α α φ λ
λ
δ δ α α
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∂
= = ⋅
∂ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −






y t y t
t t
φ
  ∂ ∂
≡ + ⋅ − + ⋅   ∂ ∂  
.  
By  manipulating  (E7),  employing  (E4)  and  the  envelope  condition  for  the  individual 












∂   = ⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅ >   ∂  
 
where  the  inequality  follows,  as  by  our  earlier  derivations, 
12 11 11 1,   and   / 0. y y y t λ > > ∂ ∂ <  





By differentiating (E7) with respect to t, one obtains: 
(E12)  







2 1 11 11 12
2
2 1 11 2 1 12 12
,
( , ) 0 2
.
2 2
t y y F t V V
A
F t t t t t
t y y V V A
t t t
α α δ λ
δ δ
α α α α φ
λ
δ δ
  ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   = + ⋅ ⋅ +
  = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
  ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ∂ ∂ ∂   + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ +
  ∂ ∂ ∂
 
   39
From (E7) it follows that: 
(E13)  ( )
12 2 1 11 12 11
2






  ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ∂ ∂   ⋅ + = −
  ∂ ∂
 
. 







2 1 11 11 2 1 12 11 12
,





t y y V V V V A
t t t t t
δ
δ






  ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −   ∂ ⋅ ⋅ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   + ⋅ − + ⋅ +     ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
 
Further re-arranging (E14), yields: 
(E15)  ( ) ( )
11 2 1 12 11 11 , 1
.
( , ) 0 2
y y F t y y A
t




  ⋅ − ⋅ ∂   ∂ ∂ ∂   = ⋅ + + − ⋅     = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
 
Notice that, 





(1/ 1) ( ) 1 0.
y y




  ∂ ∂
+ = ⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅ − >   ∂ ∂  
 
Hence, a sufficient condition for the expression on the right-hand side of (E15) to be 
negative is the following 

















y y y y y y A A
t t
t t t t t t t t
α α α
λ
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
− ⋅ < − = + + −   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
. 
By part (ii) of the lemma it follows that
2 2
1 / 0 j y t ∂ ∂ ≤ . Thus, a sufficient condition for the 
inequality in (E17) to hold is the following: 






   40
A sufficient condition for the inequality in (E19) to be satisfied is the following: 
2







The individual first-order condition is given by: 
(E21)  '( / ) (1 ) h y w w t = ⋅ − . 
Differentiation with respect to w then yields: 
(E22)  2 ''( / ) (1 )
y
w y
w h y w t
w




Fully differentiating the expression in (E22) with respect to t, employing (E21) and (E22) 
and re-arranging yields: 







h l y w
t w h y w l
   
∂     ∂     = − ⋅ + <




where the last inequality follows from our assumption that h''/h'  is non-increasing in l.  
This completes the proof.  
 
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 5 
The unique equilibrium for the game between the two countries is given by the (unique) 
implicit solution to [see equation (E7) in appendix E]: 
(F1)  ( ) ( )
12 2 1 11 11 12 , 0
2






  ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ∂ ∂   ≡ + + =
  ∂ ∂
 
 
From (F1) it follows that, 
(F2)  ( )
12 2 1 11 12 0
2





⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ∂
+ >
∂
.    41
Differentiating the expression in (E6) with respect to δ , yields: 
(F3)    ( )












δ δ α α
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ∂
= >
∂ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −
. 
Differentiating the expression on the right-hand side of (F1) with respect to δ , employing 









, yields:  
(F4)  ( ) ( ) ( )





t y y t y y F t V V
A
t t
α α α α δ λ
λ
δ δ δ δ
    ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂     = ⋅ + − >
    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
   
. 













, ( , ) 0
F t
t























someδ . Let  ( ) t δ  and  ( ) T δ  denote, respectively, the tax rate and the demo-grant set in 
the symmetric equilibrium by both countries, when migration costs are given by δ . One 
can show that choosing  ( ) t δ  and  ( ) T δ  is not a best response for country 1. To see this, 
consider a deviation to an alternative tax system given by the pair  ( ') t δ  and  ( ') T δ , where 
' δ δ > ; that is,  ( ') t δ  and  ( ') T δ  denote, respectively, the tax rate and the demo-grant set 
in the symmetric equilibrium by both countries, when migration costs are given by  ' δ . 
Notice that  ( ) ( ') t t δ δ > , by virtue  of (F5); and  ( ) ( ') T T δ δ ≤ , by our presumption. By 
deviating, country 1 will increase the utility of both individuals, and will also attract high-
skill migrants from country 2, which will create a fiscal surplus [notice that in the absence 
of these additional migrants, the pair  ( ') t δ  and  ( ') T δ  satisfies the government revenue 
constraint as equality, by construction]. We thus obtain the desired contradiction.   42
We finally turn to show that the utility of the low-skill individuals is increasing with 
respect to δ , whereas, the utility of their high-skill counterparts is decreasing with respect 
to δ . We start by examining the utility of the low-skill individuals. 
Consider  the  optimization  program  solved  by  a  government  seeking  to  maximize  the 
utility of the typical low-skill individual under autarky. The government will maximize: 
(F6)  1 1 ( , , ) max [ (1 ) ( / )] y V w t T y t T h y w ≡ − + − , 
subject to the revenues constraint: 
(F7)  1 1 2 2 [ / 2 ( ) / 2 ( )] ( ) T t y t y t K t α α = ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ≡ , 
where  ( ) j y t  is the implicit solution to  (1 ) '( / ) j j w t h y w ⋅ − = . 
Substituting for T from (F7) into (F6), yields: 
(F8)  1 1 ( , ) [ , , ( )] J w t V w t K t ≡ . 
Let 
*
1 argmax ( , ) t J w t = . As the case of autarky (no migration) is obtained as the limiting 
case of the migration equilibrium, it follows that 
* lim ( ) t t δ δ →∞ = , where, as before,  ( ) t δ  
denotes the tax rate set by both countries in the migration equilibrium, when migration 
costs are given by δ . By the second-order conditions for the government optimization, it 
follows that  1 ( , )/ 0 J w t t ∂ ∂ >  for all 
* t t < . It follows then by virtue of (F5) that the utility 
derived by the low-skill individual is indeed rising with respect to δ  (notice that in a 
symmetric  equilibrium  the  distribution  of  population  across  the  two  countries  will  be 
identical to that under autarky). 
We turn next to examine the utility derived by the high-skill individuals. Consider the 
optimization  program  solved  by  a  government  seeking  to  maximize  the  utility  of  the 
typical high-skill individual under autarky. Suppose that the tax rate is restricted to be 
non-negative (the system is restricted to be progressive). The government will maximize: 
(F9)  2 2 ( , , ) max [ (1 ) ( / )] y V w t T y t T h y w ≡ − + − , 
subject to the revenues constraint: 
(F10)  1 1 2 2 [ / 2 ( ) / 2 ( )] ( ) T t y t y t K t α α = ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ≡ ,   43
where  ( ) j y t  is the implicit solution to  (1 ) '( / ) j j w t h y w ⋅ − = . 
Substituting for T from (F10) into (F9), yields: 
(F11)  2 2 ( , ) [ , , ( )] H w t V w t K t ≡ . 
Let 
**
2 argmax ( , ) t H w t = .  As  we  restrict  ourselves  to  progressive  tax-and-transfer 
systems, it follows that 
** 0 t = , because the high-skill individuals have nothing to gain 
from re-distribution. As the case of no re-distribution is obtained as a limiting case of the 
migration equilibrium with costless migration (due to the Bertrand competition between 
the two countries) it follows that 
**
0 lim ( ) t t δ δ → = . By the second-order conditions for the 
government optimization, it follows that  2 ( , )/ 0 H w t t ∂ ∂ <  for all  0 t > . It follows then by 
virtue of (F5) that the utility derived by the high-skill individual is indeed decreasing with 
respect to δ  (notice that in a symmetric equilibrium the distribution of population across 
the two countries will be identical to that under autarky). This completes the proof.  
 
Appendix G: Robustness Simulations 
In this appendix we provide several simulations demonstrating the robustness of our key 
results  to  the  change  in  the  parameters  specification.  Our  benchmark  parameters  are: 
1 17.9 w =  (low-skill wage-rate),  2 45.645 w =  (high-skill wage-rate), e=0.4 (elasticity of 
taxable income) and  2 α =0.736 (number of high-skill workers).
14 In figure G1 we examine 
the effect of the low/high-skill wage ratio. In figure G2 we focus on the effect of the 
elasticity of taxable income. We conclude by examining the effect of the proportion of 
high-skill workers in the general population in figure G3. 
                                                            
14  Recall that total world population is normalized to 2, so that the proportion of high-skill workers is given 
by 0.736/2=0.3518 (consistent with our assumption that the low-skill workers form the majority in the 
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